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Abstract The main attention is focused on the application of the methods
of the theory of cooperative games to the analysis of the relationship be-
tween the leading actors in international politics, or, as they say, the centers
of power. One of the specic features of the modern world is the "triple
type" of conicts. Namely, at dierent levels of relationships, conict situ-
ations with three participants (players) are often observed. Such situations
are objectively characterized by the formation of possible paired coalitions,
rejecting the third. The main idea of the proposed approach is the transition
from cooperative games with deterministic values of characteristic functions
to their counterparts with stochastic values. One of the possible concepts of
solutions for stochastic cooperative games is associated with the extension
of the ideas of the bargaining set to them. Problems of development and
interpretation of this concept in the case of a triple conict of international
centers of power. An essential advantage of this approach is the possibility of
meaningful interpretations of the signicance level, at which the conditions
for the rationality of the shares of the players should be ensured, taking into
account the non-determinism of their utilities given by the characteristic
function.
Keywords: game theory, cooperative games, stochastic cooperative games,
bargaining set, intercountry interaction, centers of power.
1. General set of the problem
This paper is a development of the research begun in the works of the authors,
Konyukhovskiy, Holodkova (2017).
The situation of relations in the US-China-Russia triangle claims to be the
brightest and most obvious example. However, some other situations are also rel-
evant to the triple conguration. In particular: USA  Russia  Western Europe,
Russia  Turkey  Iran, etc.
The political atmosphere of the early 20s of the 21st century can be briey
described with the phrase general expectation of global changes in the world order.
There are many works, both scientic and publicistic, trying to give a theoretical
substantiation of the current situation. However, most of them are of an abstract,
speculative nature and do not rely on any serious quantitative mathematical models.
https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.15
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At the moment, a certain generally accepted (consensus) set of theses has been
formed regarding the relationship between economics and politics. On the one hand,
it is recognized that objective economic processes underlie fundamental political
phenomena. At the same time, few people question the thesis that political processes
radically aect the state of both the macroeconomic systems of individual countries
and regions, and the world economic system as a whole.
The purpose of the research, the results of which are reected in this paper, is to
develop methods for analyzing the patterns of interaction between world centers of
power, which make it possible to obtain realistic adequate explanations of the causes
of conicts and confrontation, on the one hand, and possible points of reaching
mutual agreements, on the other.
2. Previous research
It is necessary to note three groups of scientic sources on which this study is
based.
First, there are works that consider cooperative games with transferable utility
and concepts for their solution. Secondly, these are papers and monographs devoted
to the problems of the application of cooperative games in the eld of political
science, political-economic and socio-political problems. Finally, these are studies
devoted to the problems of the main subject area of current research. These, as
already mentioned, include the patterns of interaction at the international level of
countries and interstate coalitions. The principles of forming such coalitions, the
logic of their cooperation and confrontation.
The theoretical and mathematical apparatus of the paper is based on the fun-
damental works of Shapley, Shubik (1954), Banzhaf (1965), and others.
This work is based on two fundamental theoretical ideas. First, the application
of the toolkit of stochastic cooperative games to modeling political and economic
systems and the relations of their subjects. Secondly, the implementation of the
concept of a bargaining set for stochastic cooperative models.
Approaches to the denition of stochastic cooperative games and games and the
analysis of their properties are devoted to the works Suijs, Born (1999), Suijs (1999),
Suijs, Born (1999), Yeung, Petrosyan (2006), Konyukhovskiy (2012), Konyukhovskiy,
Holodkova (2017)..
In terms of the concept of a bargaining set and the possibilities of its exten-
sion to stochastic cooperative games, this paper is based on the classic work of
Aumann, Maschler (1961).
The scientic direction associated with the application of the methods of the the-
ory of cooperative games to the modeling of political and political-economic research
has a fairly rich history at the moment. An important place among the sources is
occupied by the works of Penrose (1946), Johnston (1978), Deegan, Packel (1978),
Holler, Packel (1983).
They reect the problem of meaningful interpretation of game models in relation
to the specics of the behavior of political and socio-political systems in conditions
of conict of interest. Also, these works formulate "classical" approaches to assessing
the inuence of players and the coalition. For example, the calculation of the index of
inuence of various parliamentary coalitions. This is of fundamental importance for
the subsequent development of methods for constructing the characteristic functions
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of games that describe the interaction of subjects of the system of international
relations.
Among the Russian studies devoted to the application of the theory of co-
operative games in models of political interaction, one should note the works of
Aleskerov, Kravchenko, (2008). They are devoted to the analysis of the distribu-
tion of inuence between factions in various compositions of the State Duma of
the Russian Empire. The article by Sokolova (2008) is devoted to the calculation of
inuence indices and examines them on the examples of the Council of Ministers of
the European Union and the modern Russian State Duma.
The current political, political, economic and socio-economic situation in the
world is characterized by increased turbulence, dynamic changes in the roles and
capabilities of traditional players, and the emergence of new players. Declarations
of instability, along with calls for the restoration of stability, have become common-
place in international diplomatic discourse. Moreover, the very meanings invested in
the term "stability" look like something fuzzy and vague. How to correctly interpret
goals for achieving stability. Should we try to return to a pre-existing stable state,
if possible, reduce the turbulence and variability of the current situation, or look
for some "new stability" in the future?
This set of problems is reected in modern scientic and applied research. In
particular, it is worth paying attention to the following works.
The monograph Keersmaeker (2015) examines the problems of the concepts of
"unipolar" and "multipolar" world. The author expresses doubts about their cor-
rectness and formulates a position suggesting a refusal to use the concept of "polar-
ity". These questions are linked to the topic of this study, since it formulates versions
of cooperative game-theoretic models that partially explain the mechanisms of the
transition from a unipolar world to a multipolar one.
The monograph Degterev (2020) presents theoretical approaches to assessing
multipolarity and the balance of power in the international arena. Both objective
and subjective factors of perception of the balance of power in the world arena, which
dominate in modern international political discourse, are analyzed. In this paper,
the assessment of the potential of individual states is complemented by an analysis
of strategic triangles, regional integration groupings and international alliances.
An essay by Raymond (2018) addresses the issue of multipolarity in the face of
erosion of US inuence. The author pays special attention to the strategy of action
of third countries (on the example of the position of Australia). The work focuses
on the fact that in modern discourse the problem of multipolarity is illuminated, as
a rule, from the standpoint of the central role of the United States and attention is
drawn to the need to take into account the legacy of the eras of colonization, decol-
onization, state building and the development of local norms of specic countries
and regions.
The article by Blagden (2019) proposes an interpretation of the concept of "mul-
tipolarity" as a special causal concept based on the principles of the possibility of
balancing by a certain group of powers of any other power, including the most pow-
erful one. Also, this work analyzes the content and meanings invested in the terms
"polarity" and "multipolarity" in modern British political discourse.
Trush (2020) provides a meaningful analysis of the prospects for Russian-Chinese
political and military-political cooperation. Particular attention is paid to the risks
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and the adequacy of potential agreements from the perspective of relations in the
US-China-Russia triangle.
The models considered in this work can become an eective tool for describing
situations of this type and their subsequent analysis.
3. Game-theoretic formalization of the problem of interaction of
centers of power
The main idea of the application of a game-theoretic approach to the analysis
of the interaction of international centers of power in the modern political arena
involves the interpretation of their relationship in the form of a cooperative game
with a transferable utility (I, v), where
I = {1, ...n}  a set of players;
v  the characteristic function (2I → R), that assigns the value of the usefulness
(utility, payo) of the coalition in the event of its formation (v({S})) for each subset
of players S ⊂ I (a coalition of players).
Traditional concepts for solving cooperative games, such as Core, Kernel, Nu-
cleolus, are based on the concepts of "imputation" and "pre-mputation".
The denition of "cooperative game solution" based on the concepts of "impu-
tation" and "pre-imputation". Imputation in cooperative game (I, v) is a vector
x = (x1, x2, ...xn) satisfying the conditions:
• individual rationality




xi = v({I}). (2)
Thus, the imputation is such a distribution of the utility of the full coalition of
all players (the so-called "grand coalition"), which provides each of the players with
a utility no less than he can receive individually (without joining any coalition).
Within the framework of this paper, we will restrict ourselves to the models of
"triple" conicts, that is, cooperative games in which I = {1, 2, 3}. Both countries
and intercountry associations can act as players, depending on the specic nature
of the simulated situation.
The problem of choosing a methodology for constructing a characteristic function
is extremely serious and fundamental from the point of view of the success or failure
of the application of the game-theoretic cooperative model.
On an intuitive verbal level, the thesis that the competition between countries
and blocs at the international level is for political inuence seems quite reasonable.
In this case, inuence is understood to be the extent to which the interests of a
country (or a group of countries) will be taken into account when reaching the
next agreement, resolving a dispute, etc. Moreover, it is not a one-time success in a
specic situation that is much more important and essential, but the accumulated
weight, which determines the degree of consideration of interest in potential (future)
situations.
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Unfortunately, such a verbal interpretation of "political inuence" cannot be
simply and unambiguously correlated with some specic and generally accepted
quantitative indicators. Because of this, one has to be content with abstract (con-
ditional) indicators.
Of course, it is very dicult to correlate such an approach with the classical
interpretations of cooperative games, in which imputations and pre-imputations
are treated as shares of some good (utility) in which the players are interested.
At the same time, taking into account the complexities of the real practice of
using game-theoretic models, this drawback does not seem to be something partic-
ularly challenging and out of the general range of conventions and abstractions.
Within the framework of this study, the performance (utility) of players and
coalitions is assessed using the abstract level of political inuence, which is consid-
ered a value that takes values on the interval [0, 1] (0  no inuence, 1  maximum
inuence). In the simplest situations, a quantitative assessment of the "inuence"
of a player (coalition) can, for example, be based on the proportion of issues (prob-
lems), the solution to which can be blocked without its consent, in the total set of
international problems under consideration. While agreeing with the controversial
nature of this approach, one cannot but admit that on most issues of interstate
interaction, veto players are usually dened quite simply.
Here, the authors largely follow the traditions of political science applications of
cooperative games laid down in the works of Shapley, Shubik (1954),Banzhaf (1965).
The paper by Konyukhovskiy, Holodkova (2017) was devoted to simple game-
theoretic models of "triple conicts".
In this paper, in particular, versions of a cooperative game with three partici-
pants were considered for various values of individual and coalition utilities. Also,
the values of the main solutions for these games were obtained (Shapley vector,
Core, Nucleolus). These results are of practical interest. In particular, they provide
a fairly realistic and adequate interpretation of the principal trends in the devel-
opment of relations in the USA  China  Russia triangle in the period from 1992
to 2016. In more general settings, one can consider not only the United States, but
also the so-called "United Western World" (conditionally  "West").
For clarity and transparency of the subsequent presentation, we give a brief
overview of the previously constructed models and the conclusions obtained on
their basis.
Table 1 shows the versions of the characteristic functions for the "principal"
interaction congurations. Hereinafter, it is assumed that player 1 is the strongest
from the point of view of potential inuence, then the players' opportunities decrease
in the order of increasing their numbers. Based on the content of the concept of "level
of inuence", the value of the characteristic function for the full ("big") coalition is
assumed to be equal to 1.
Table 1. Characteristic functions for dierent versions of "triple interaction" models.
Version Period {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3}
(a) Period 1992-2008 0.8 0 0 1 1 0
(d) Symmetrical multipolar world 0 0 0 1 1 1
(e) Asymmetrical multipolar world 0.4 0.2 0 1 1 1
Source:conditional data
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Model version (a) (see Table 1) corresponds to the alignment of forces in the
period conventionally outlined as 1992â2008. At this time, there was an obvious
predominance of player 1 (the "western world") and the lack of opportunities and
players 2 and 3 to counterbalance his inuence even in the case of joining a coalition.
Fig.1 gives a geometric interpretation of the set of non-negative pre-imputation
for the game in version (a). The set of pre-imputations for the game n = 3 is the
set of vectors lying on the plane
x1 + x2 + x3 = v({I}) (3)
in three-dimensional space. For these reasons, for geometric interpretations of games
n = 3, "at illustrations" are used, representing the plane (3).
One of the simplest and most natural directions of analysis of the game in
question is the study of its Core (a set of undominated imputations):






xi = v(I)}. (4)
As you can see from 1 Core of game (a) is a one-point set
C(v) = (1, 0, 0). (5)
This fact means maximum Player 1 inuence.
While recognizing the validity of possible criticism based on the arguments that
the obtained solution (5) is completely determined by the degree of arbitrariness
that was laid down in the construction of the characteristic function (Table 1),
at the same time it should be noted that it reects the mechanisms with a high
degree of reliability the dominance of the United States (the united "West") at the
stage that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Not having 100% inuence
(v({1}) = 0.8 < 1), Player 1, nevertheless, ensured himself full control due to the
fact that any coalitions that received 100% inuence were impossible without his
participation:
v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = 1,
provided that v({2, 3}) = 0.
It can also be noted that with such a structure of games, the value of the
individual inuence of the Player 1 is not principal. Even if it were much less than
0.8 (in the limit equal to zero), solution (5) would remain unchanged. Since it is
determined solely by the fact that in the game given by Table 1, any coalition must
contain Player1 ("Union West") to be a winning one.
The thesis about the importance of transition from a unipolar world to a mul-
tipolar one is widely known. Appearing around the turn of the third millennium, it
has taken one of the leading places in modern political science discourse.
One of the important positive characteristics of the proposed cooperative game-
theoretic models is the possibility of describing, with their help, at a formalized
level, the mechanisms of the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order.
The latter correspond to model versions (d) and (e), in Table 1.
Model version (d) reects a situation in which no player alone can gain inuence
in the world. At the same time, any coalition of two participants gains absolute
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Fig. 1. Geometric interpretation of the set of pre-divisions for the game, version (a)
inuence (it can impose its own conditions of the game on a third non-aligned
participant). Of course, the full coalition also has absolute inuence.
A geometric illustration of the set of pre-imputations for the game in version
(d) is shown in Fig.2
As you can see, the game in version (d) has an empty core. The intersection of




















Each of them corresponds to a "conspiracy" of two players who share the in-
uence equally, with the exclusion of the third participant who receives nothing.
These distributions are characterized by obvious instability, since there are obvious
threats against them. With any conguration, each of the "united parties" has rea-
son to suspect the partner that he can, without loss of usefulness for himself, agree
with the "superuous third." Nucleolus in game (d), due to the symmetry of the
participants' capabilities, is the vector
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Fig. 2. Geometric interpretation of the set of pre-divisions for the game, version (d)
It is easy to check that the Nucleolus in this game coincides with the Shapley
vector. However, (6) has all the disadvantages of an "unstable, contested" solution,
from which the players have incentives to deviate (going between x1,2,x1,3 and x2,3).
The "symmetry" of the instability of the solutions x1,2,x1,3,x2,3 in the game (d)
is due to the complete symmetry of the players' capabilities. The realism of such
an assumption, obviously, raises serious doubts. This disadvantage can be partly
overcome by dierentiating the individual utilities of the players - version (e), Tabel
1.
The characteristic function in model (e) is based on the assumption of the rela-
tive increase in the potential of player 2 in relation to player 3. Of course, the ratio
itself is 0.2 to 0.4 can become a reason for disputes and objections. However, at the
level of qualitative analysis, one can agree with such values. First of all, because it
is not so much the absolute values as their ordering relative to each other that are
of fundamental importance.
Fig.3 (a geometric illustration of the game (e)) allows us to visually demonstrate
the transformation of the solutions x1,2,x1,3,x2,3, which we identied in the game
(d) and assuming the distribution of inuence between two players when excluding
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Fig. 3. Geometric interpretation of the set of pre-divisions for the game, version (e)
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from the division third party. It is assumed that the beneciary players (i, j) in the
division xi,j equally divide the value v({I}) − v({i}) − v({j}), i.e. the dierence
between the usefulness of a full coalition (maximum possible impact) and their
individual usefulness. For example,
x1,2 =
(











= (0.6, 0.4, 0).
As it is easy to see, in game (e), participants 2 and 3, if they "achieve" the
distribution x2,3 = (0, 0.6, 0.4), have no incentive to abandon this alliance in favor
of coalitions with Player 1, in which they gets a smaller share.
In a sense, the higher individual utility of Player 1, and hence the higher level of
"initial grievances," work against him. They make a separate agreement with him
less protable for other participants in the game. Another important consequence
of the dierences between models (d) and (e) is that in model (e) Nucleolus diers
from the Shapley vector. The essential dierences between games (d) and (e) quite
clearly demonstrate the dierences that arise between the Nucleolus. By compar-
ing dierent concepts of solutions in the framework of model (e), it is possible to
formulate proposals for a consistent distribution in case the players overcome the
"temptation of pairing" and are able to form a "big coalition":
Player 1  from 33 to 43% inuence;
Player 2  about 33% inuence;
Player 3  from 23 to 33%.
4. Bargaining set concept
Studies of triple models of opposition of centers of power leads us to the conclu-
sion that the situation is typical, in which there is no expediency in the formation
of a full coalition of participants (i.e. the utility of the full coalition is set to zero).
In such cases, the bargaining set is a more preferable and adequate solution concept
(in comparison with Core, Nucleolus, Shapley vector). This concept was proposed
in a fundamental article by Aumann, Maschler (1961).
For a brief introduction, we have to introduce the tern of payo conguration
(x,S) = (x1, x2, . . . , xn;S
1, S2, . . . , Sm), (7)
where x1,x2,â¦xn  the amount of utility received by players.
S1,S2,. . .,Sm  a set of coalitions in which players unite to achieve the specied
utility values. This set of coalitions must satisfy for the next conditions:
• the condition of pairwise empty intersection of coalitions
Si ∩ Sk = ∅, i ̸= k, (8)
• the completeness of the set
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n⋃
i=1
Si = I, (9)
• reachability of the promised distribution for each coalition
∑
k∈Si
xk ≤ v({Si}). (10)
The idea embodied in the denition of payo conguration is quite transparent
and simple. The players are divided into the coalition system S = (S1, S2, Sm), each
coalition achieves some result (utility) v({Si}), which, in turn, is divided between
its members in accordance with the shares given by the vector x = (x1, x2, xn).
The natural requirement for a payo conguration seems to be the conditions
of coalition rationality (CR)
(∀S, Si ∈ {S}, S ⊂ Si)
∑
k∈S
xk ≥ v({S}). (11)
The condition (11) means that a rational payo conguration across all its coali-
tions must ensure that any subsets of players (sub-coalitions) included in these
coalitions are paid no less than those that are available to these sub-coalitions in-
dependently (without joining other coalitions).
Let K be some coalition of participants (K ⊂ I). Player j is called a partner K
in the payo conguration (x,S).
If he is a member of such a coalition Si ∈ {S} such that K ∩ Si ̸= ∅ . Denote
by P [K; (x,S)] the set of all partners of the coalition K in the payo conguration
(x,S), i.e.
P [K; (x,S)] = {j | j ∈ Si,K ∩ Si ̸= ∅}.
Pay attention to the following important points.
First, in accordance with the proposed denition, a player who is a partner of
the coalition K may not belong to this coalition.
It is enough that he belongs to a coalition, the individual players of which belong
to K. Secondly, K ⊂ P [K; (x,S)].
The latter is quite obvious: every member of K is the partner for other partici-
pants of this coalition, certainly.
Let (x,S) be a coalitionally rational payo conguration in some cooperative
game Γ . Let K and L be disjoint subsets of some coalition Si ∈ {S} (K ⊂ Si, L ⊂
Si,K ∩ Si = ∅).
Then the objection of coalition K against coalition L in payo conguration
(x,S) will be called the coalition-rational payo conguration
(y,C) = (y1, y2, . . . , yn;C
1, C2, . . . , Cl),
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for which
P [K; (y,C)] ∩ L = ∅, (12)
(∀j ∈ K) yj > xj , (13)
∀(j ∈ P [K; (y,C)]) yj ≥ xj . (14)
The conditions (12)(14) mean that players belonging to coalition K, without
participation of players belonging to coalition L, within a certain coalition-rational
payo conguration (y,C) (dierent from the current payo conguration (x,S))
can get better results. At the same time, the reasonability of the change of congu-
rations is conrmed by the fact that their "new partners" will receive payments in
(y,C) no less than in (x,S).
Let (x,S) be the coalitionally rational payo conguration in the game Γ , (y,C)
be the objection of the coalitionK against the coalition L with respect to (x,S),K ⊂
Si, L ⊂ Si,K∩Si = ∅. The counter objection of the coalition L against the coalition
K will be called the coalitionally rational payo-conguration.
(z,D) = (z1, z2, . . . zn;D
1, D2, . . . Dk),
for which
K ̸⊂ P [L; (z,D)] (15)
(∀j ∈ P [L; (z,D)]) zj ≥ xj , (16)
(∀j ∈ P [L; (z,D)] ∩ P [K; (y,C)]) zj ≥ yj . (17)
The conditions (15)(17) mean that the coalition L in response to the "threat-
ening" payo conguration (y,C) can oer a payo conguration (z,D) in which
its members, its new partners, and potential coalition partners K by conguration
(y,C) will receive a payment not less than in the current conguration (x,S). At
the same time to achieve this result, she does not need members of the coalition K.
A coalitionally rational payo conguration (x,S) is called stable if for each
objection of K against L there is counter-objection L against K. The set of all
stable coalitionally rational payo congurations in the game Γ will be called the
bargaining set (µ-set or µ-stable set). The following theorem is valid.
The bargaining set of a game Γ can be represented as a set of solutions of a
conjunctive-disjunctive linear inequality system with respect to variables xj .
Thus, the bargaining set can be represented as the union of convex polyhedrals
in n-dimensional linear space.
For the case of a game with three participants and utilities given by Table 2 the
expression for the distributions of the payo congurations of the participants has
a fairly simple and understandable form.
In accordance with the denitions (12)(14), (15)(17) the bargaining set of the
game given in Table 2 belongs to the payo conguration ((0, 0, 0); {1, 2, 3}).
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Table 2. Utilities for the game n = 3 with nonzero utilities of paired coalitions
{1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
0 0 0 v1,2 v1.3 v2,3 0
Source:conditional data
If there is no "dominant" pair coalition, that is, if the coalition utilities satisfy the
inequalities
v12 ≤ v13 + v23, v13 ≤ v12 + v23, v23 ≤ v12 + v13 (18)
then the payo congurations forming the bargaining set have the form
x1 =
v12+v13−v23
2 , x2 =
v12+v23−v13
2 , x3 = 0; {1, 2}, {3};
x1 =
v12+v13−v23
2 , x2 = 0, x3 =
v13+v23−v12
2 ; {1, 3}, {2};
x1 = 0, x2 =
v12+v23−v13
2 , x3 =
v13+v23−v12
2 ; {1}, {2, 3}.
(19)
In the case of the paired coalition {1,2}, the objection of player 1 against player
2 means the transition to the coalition {1,3}, and the counter-objection 2 against 1
means the transition to the coalition {2,3}. Thus, it makes no sense for player 1 to
"destroy" the coalition {1,2} if the share he receives in alliance with player 2 is not
less than the share that player 3 can oer
x1 = v12 − x2 ≥ v13 − x3. (20)
At the same time, the player 2 will support the coalition {1,2} if the share he
receives in alliance with player 1 is also not less than the share that player 3 can
oer
x2 = v12 − x1 ≥ v23 − x3 (21)
and of course the distribution x1 + x2 should correspond to the abilities of the
coalition
x1 + x2 = v12. (22)
Repeating similar reasoning for other coalitions (taking into account possible
objections and counter- objections), we come to the conclusion that conditions (20)
(21) must be satised as strict equalities
v12 − x2 = v13 − x3, v12 − x1 = v23 − x3. (23)
Whence, taking into account (22), an explicit expression for x3 is obtained.
Explicit expressions for x1 and x2 are obtained in a similar way.
In Fig.4 shows a geometric illustration of the bargaining set for the game under
consideration (Table 2), in the absence of a prevailing (dominant) pair coalition.
If there is a "dominant" pair coalition (for example, v12 > v13 + v23), then the
payo congurations forming the bargaining set have the form
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Fig. 4. Bargaining set for the situation of the absence of a dominant pair coalition:
v12 ≤ v13 + v23, v13 ≤ v12 + v23, v23 ≤ v12 + v13

v13 ≤ x1 ≤ v12 − v23, x2 = v12 − x1, x3 = 0; {1, 2}, {3};
x1 = v13, x2 = 0, x3 = 0; {1, 3}, {2};
x1 = 0, x2 = v23, x3 = 0; {1}, {2, 3}.
(24)
The geometric illustration of the bargaining set for the case of the existence of
a prevailing coalition (v12 > v13 + v23) is given in Fig.5.
A rigorous derivation of formulas (19) and (24) specifying payo congurations
for the game under consideration is given in the work in Auman  Mashler.
From the point of view of potential applied aspects of this model, the direction
of research of transformation points of specic characteristic functions, at which the
conguration of solutions changes from (19) to (24) and vice versa, seems promising
and interesting.
It is obvious that such a transformation in real triple conicts radically changes
the system of relationships between the participants, sharply strengthening the
"strongest" and actually nullifying the opportunities and claims of the "weak part-
ners".
In what follows, by default (without loss of generality), we can accept the as-
sumption that the players and coalitions are numbered in such a way that the
relations
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Fig. 5. Bargaining set for the situation of the existence of a dominant pair coalition:
v12>v13+v23
v1,2 ≥ v1,3 ≥ v2,3, (25)
i.e. there is a gradual decrease in the strength of coalitions from {1,2} to {2,3} and
from the point of view of coalition utility player 1 is the strongest, and player 3, on
the contrary, is the weakest.
5. Stochastic cooperative games
One of the problems that we face when used as a base for the construction of
the characteristic function of the minimum income in the currency volatility, built
on the basis of a portfolio of exchange members of the coalition is the stochastic
nature of the data. A constructive solution to this problem is associated with the
transition from deterministic to stochastic cooperative games.
In the modern theory of cooperative games it has developed several approaches
to the denition of "stochastic cooperative game". One of the rst studies in this
direction was the work Charnes, Granot (1973) Charnes, Granot (1977). Also worth
mentioning is the series of works on the subject Yeung, Petrosyan (2004),
Yeung, Petrosyan (2006), Suijs, Born (1999),Suijs (1999), Suijs, Born (1999).
In this article a stochastic cooperative game (SCG) we mean a pair Γ = (I, ṽ)
where
I = {1...n}  the set of participants;
ṽ(S)  random variables with known distribution density pṽ(S)(x) which interpreted
as revenues (utility payments), the corresponding coalitions S ⊂ I.
This approach to the task of stochastic cooperative games were previously pre-
sented in the paper Konyukhovskiy (2012).
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Imputation stochastic cooperative game will be called the vector x(α) ∈ Rn
satisfying for conditions
(a) (∀i ∈ I) P{xi(α) ≥ ṽ(i)} ≥ α (26)




xi(α) ≤ ṽ(I)} ≥ α (27)
 stochastic analog of the group rationality.
Note that the condition (26) sets that the share prescribed by delay x(α) for
i-th player has to be greater or equal than the random value of his personal gain
with a probability of not less than α. In accordance with (26) i-th component of the
vector division x(α) compared with the α-quantile Fṽ(i)(x) (distribution function









for some coalition S ⊂ I . Then (26) can be written as
(∀i ∈ I) xi(α) ≥ vα(i). (30)
The possibility of transformation from condition (26) to (30) follows from the
properties of non-decreasing distribution functions. Indeed, the condition xi(α) ≥
ṽ(i) is satised for a certain level of probability α , will be carried out for all α
′
> α.
In the classical cooperative games under group rationality means the need for full
distribution utility large (complete) coalition within the division. In a modication
of the stochastic game (27) means that the big (full) coalition is able to win with
a probability of not less than α , to ensure the realization of the imputation x(α)







≤ 1− α. (31)
From (31), denoting vα(I) = F
−1
ṽ(I)(α) the α-quantile of the distribution function
Fṽ(I)(x), we obtain
∑m
i=1 xi(α) ≥ v1−α(I).
We emphasize quite a signicant dierence. If the normal condition of cooper-
ative games group rationality is dened as the strict equality and thus denes a
hyperplane in n-dimensional space, the approach proposed here it is in the form
of inequality and denes loosely in half-dimensional space. Thus, the "nature" of
vectors that satisfy the denition (26)(27) diers from the "nature" of imputations
in their classical interpretation. Sometimes for naming such objects use the term
"distributions" (allocations).
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As a result, the system conditions, which determines imputation stochastic game,
takes the form




xi(α) ≤ v1−α(I). (33)
For values vα(i) in modern risk management usually apply the term value at
risk VaR (Value at Risk). In this connection it may be noted advantages of the
approach (32)(33). Namely, it is logically consistent with the concept of VaR. This
potentially opens up opportunities for a meaningful interpretation of the results of
subsequent studies of the properties of this class of games and concepts of nding
solutions.
6. Implementation of the concept of a negotiation set on stochastic
cooperative models
As it is easy to see, the assumption about the deterministic nature of the utility
(payos) of coalitions vi,j is rather rigid. In reality, it is extremely dicult to un-
equivocally assess the consequences and eects of coalition associations, especially
given the hypothetical nature of some of them.
As a consequence, cooperative game models with stochastic characteristic func-
tions are more promising and preferable in the case of interaction of international
centers of power, where each coalition of players S ⊂ 2I is associated with a random
variable ṽ{S} (random utility) with some known distribution density pṽ{S}(x).
In the case of stochastic game models, there is a transformation of the relation-
ships reecting the system of mutual objections and counter-objections.
In particular, the objections of player 1 against player 2 consists in abandoning
the coalition {1, 2} and creating the coalition {1, 3}, will be justied if the inequality
ṽ1,2 − x2 ≤ ṽ1,3 − x3, (34)
that is, provided that the share of the rst player does not decrease.
On the other hand, the "compensating" threat of player 1 against player 3
(abandoning the coalition {1, 3} and forming a coalition with player 2) leads to the
opposite inequality
ṽ1,3 − x3 ≤ ṽ1,2 − x2, (35)
It is as a result of combining such inequalities in the deterministic case that the
equations that determine the bargaining set are obtained. It is easy to see that this
approach cannot be directly extended to the stochastic version of the game, so for
continuous random variables (as instance, ṽ1,2, ṽ1,3)
Pr{ṽ1,2 − x2 = ṽ1,3 − x3} = 0. (36)
In this regard, an approach based on determining the values of x2 and x3 from
the condition of equiprobability of events seems to be constructive
x2 − x3 ≤ ṽ1,2 − ṽ1,3 and x2 − x3 ≥ ṽ1,2 − ṽ1,3 (37)
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or
Pr{ṽ1,2 − ṽ1,3 ≤ x2 − x3} = Pr{ṽ1,2 − ṽ1,3 ≤ x2 − x3} = 0.5. (38)
In terms of content, condition (38) means the choice of the median value of the
random variable ṽ1,2 − ṽ1,3 as an estimate for the dierence x2 − x3.
For compactness in the subsequent presentation we will use the notation
w̃k,i = ṽk,i − ṽk,j , i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (39)
Accordingly, pw̃i,j (x) is the density function of the random variable w̃i,j , and
F ˜wi,j (x) = Pr{w̃i,j ≤ x} is the distribution function of w̃i,j , F−1w̃i,j (x)) is the inverse
distribution function.
Based on this logic, we can obtain similar expressions for the remaining pairs of
mutual objections and counter- objections. As a result, we get
xi − xj = median(ṽk,i − ṽk,j), i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (40)
We also denote
median(ṽk,i − ṽk,j)) = mi,j , i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (41)
Based on (40) (for specic i, j, k), we can obtain the relations
x1 − x2 = m1,2 = F−1w̃1,2(0.5), (42)
x1 − x3 = m1,3 = F−1w̃1,3(0.5) (43)
this allows expressing
m1,2 +m1,3 = x1 − x2 + x1 − x3 = 2x1 − (x2 + x3) (44)
and further
x1 =
(m1,2 +m1,3) + (x2 + x3)
2
. (45)
By analogy from expressions
x2 − x1 = m2,1 = F−1w̃2,1(0.5), (46)
x2 − x3 = m2,3 = F−1w̃2,3(0.5) (47)
we can get
x2 =





(m3,1 +m3,2) + (x1 + x2)
2
. (49)
In the deterministic version of the game, the single-valued values xk, were ob-
tained by substituting the values of the utilities of pairwise coalitions (xi+xj = vi,j).
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In the case of stochastic coalitional utilities, an approach seems reasonable, ac-
cording to which the deterministic coalitional utility is replaced by its estimate
based on the principles of the VaR (value at risk) concept (for a certain given level
of probability α).
With this approach, the utility that a coalition of players i, j can "reasonably"








In terms of content, this means that if







Pr{xi + xj ≤ ṽi,j} ≥ α, (52)
i.e. with probability at least α, the utility of the coalition {i, j} will provide the
payo xi+xj . In this case, the values of the distributions belonging to the stochastic
bargaining set are given as
xk =





By analogy with (19), a stochastic bargaining set can be described by a system
of payo congurations 
x1, x2, 0; {1, 2}, {3};
x1, 0, x3; {1, 3}, {2};
0, x2, x3; {1}, {2, 3}.
(54)
where the value x1, x2, x3 are determined by the formulas (53).
A signicant warning must be given. The stochastic nature of the model also
predetermines the hypothetical nature of the values of the payos xk given by
formulas (53).
In other words, they should be considered as some potential basis for reaching
coalition agreements when the coalition members realize the zero probability of
obtaining utility exactly equal to the values from formulas (53).
7. Empirical aspects of the analysis of stochastic cooperative models
of interaction of centers of force
Let us dwell on some aspects of the practical application of the bargaining
set concept for the stochastic implementation of a cooperative game with three
participants.
First of all, we need to decide on the choice of the class of distribution density
functions used in modeling the stochastic utilities of players. Based on the meaning-
ful properties of the models describing the processes of interaction of world centers
of power, the "acceptable" candidates are, for example, asymmetric triangular dis-
tributions.
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The corresponding graphs are shown in Fig.6 (density functions), Fig.7 (distri-
bution functions).
Fig. 6. Example of density for the asymmetrical triangular distribution functions (for
stochastic coalition utilities ṽ1,2, ṽ1,3, ṽ2,3
Another quite suitable distribution for the models we are considering is the dis-
tributions of the PERT class. The corresponding graphs are shown in Fig.8 (density
functions) Fig.9 (distribution functions).
The density and distribution functions for the dierences w̃k,j determined by
formulas (39) do not have simple explicit expressions. This is true both in the case
of the distribution of pairwise coalition utilities ṽi,j according to the asymmetric
triangular law, and in the case of their distribution according to the PERT law.
For this reason, methods based on numerical modeling of stochastic dierences w̃k,j
seem to be promising. Let us give examples of constructing stochastic bargaining
sets for the case of PERT distribution of pairwise coalition utilities.
Provided that all utilities in the game are normalized and take values on the
interval [0,1], the PERT density is uniquely determined by the choice of the mode.
Table 3 presents two variants of a stochastic cooperative game that simulates
the conditions for the interaction of centers of power.
Table 4 shows the values of the components xi (i = {1, 2, 3}) forming a stochastic
bargaining set for two principal versions of pairwise coalition utilities, at dierent
levels of probability α.
Negative values x3, in the rows of Table 4, in terms of meaning, can be inter-
preted as an additional reason for doubting the possibility of coalitions with the
participation of a third player and, accordingly, as a low assessment of his ability
to inuence (within the modeling situation).
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Fig. 7. Example of the asymmetrical triangular distribution functions (for stochastic coali-
tion utilities ṽ1,2, ṽ1,3, ṽ2,3
Fig. 8. Example of density for the PERT distribution functions (for stochastic coalition
utilities ṽ1,2, ṽ1,3, ṽ2,3
8. Conclusion
The methods of the modern theory of cooperative games can act as eective
tools for modeling and analyzing the processes of redistribution of political and
economic-political inuence between world centers of power.
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Fig. 9. Example of the PERT distribution functions (for stochastic coalition utilities
ṽ1,2, ṽ1,3, ṽ2,3
Table 3. Modes of the distribution density functions of pairwise stochastic coalition util-
ities in a cooperative game with three participants (three centers of power)
Version ṽ1,2 ṽ1,3 ṽ2,3
I 0.8 0.6 0.4
II 0.9 0.5 0.2
Source:conditional data
The examples given in this paper largely indicate that cooperative game models
provide some internally consistent logic that explains the trends in accordance with
which relationships have evolved and the redistribution of inuence between world
centers of power has taken place over the past decades.
A condition for the successful development of cooperative models of interaction
of centers of power is, on the one hand, the improvement of methods for constructing
characteristic functions in the direction of increasing the level of adequacy of taking
into account the objective interests (utility) of countries and coalitions.
On the other hand, the work on improving the level of the mathematical appa-
ratus used in the models, and, in particular, the apparatus of stochastic cooperative
games, is very important in terms of the development of possible solution concepts,
on the basis of which conclusions are drawn regarding the parameters of possible
inter-coalition agreements.
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Table 4. Values of distributions x1, x2, x3, forming a stochastic bargaining set in a game
with three participants
Version I Version II
α x1 x2 x3 x1 x2 x3
0.95 0.27 0.13 -0.03 0.37 0.13 -0.15
0.90 0.30 0.17 0.02 0.39 0.16 -0.11
0.85 0.31 0.18 0.04 0.40 0.18 -0.08
0.80 0.33 0.20 0.06 0.42 0.20 -0.06
0.75 0.35 0.22 0.08 0.43 0.21 -0.04
0.7 0.36 0.24 0.10 0.44 0.23 -0.03
Source:conditional data
Fig. 10. Series of vector values depending on the probability levels α for versions I and II
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